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Abstract
Mismatch can be considered as misallocation, and may have eﬀects on
both productivity and inequality. This paper provides a quantitative
assessment of a model of mismatch for a frictional labour market in which
workers diﬀer by skill level, jobs diﬀer by skill requirement and creating a
vacancy with a given skill-requirement entails a fixed cost (of technology
adoption). We calibrate the model to US data. In contrast to the existing
literature on mismatch, we calibrate to observable targets, such as skill-
specific unemployment rates and wage premia, rather than unobservable
or poorly identified parameters such as the value of leisure, vacancy
posting costs and relative productivity. Using this calibration strategy
we show that the equilibrium with mismatch cannot arise for any feasible
combination of parameter values; whereas regrading and segmentation
are plausible outcomes. Fixed costs of technology adoption, which are
omitted from previous studies, play a critical role. Without fixed costs
the equilibria proposed in the literature do not exist, because a firm
is unable to commit to hold open a job with a given skill requirement
in the event that it meets a worker of a diﬀerent skill level. We show
that a much richer set of equilibria arises if a firm must pay a fixed
cost to open a vacancy with a particular skill-requirement. As well as
equilibria with mismatch and with segmentation, new equilibria may
arise in which a firm regrades its vacancy so that its skill-requirements
match the skill level of the worker it has met. Finally, we demonstrate
that the existence of multiple equilibria in previous work is simply an
artefact of the calibration framework adopted therein.
1 Introduction.
How do frictional labour markets behave when workers have heteroge-
neous skills and jobs have diﬀering skill-requirements? What can ac-
count for skill-specific diﬀerences in labour market outcomes such as
wages and unemployment? What diﬀerence does the nature of interac-
tion between workers of diﬀerent skill levels (and vacancies with diﬀer-
ent skill-requirements) make? One approach is to treat the heterogenous
labour market as segmented, so that jobs are skill-specific. Then one skill
group impacts on another primarily through demand.1 Another possi-
bility arises when at least one job may be undertaken by more than one
skill-level of worker and at least one side of the labour market does not
segregate prior to search. In this case the interaction between workers
with diﬀerent skills (and between jobs with diﬀerent skill requirements)
in the search and matching process may be a key mechanism in gener-
ating misallocation of resources (mismatch) and influencing aggregate
productivity. Inequality, as described in Table 1, may also be influenced
by this process. For example, if high-skilled workers may undertake low
skill-requirement jobs, this may act to crowd out low-skilled workers (in-
creasing the congestion eﬀects for low-skilled workers engaged in search).
At the same time, the pattern of spillovers is potentially intricate; the
fact that high-skilled workers are prepared to undertake low-skilled tasks
may increase the profitability of opening low skill-requirement vacancies
at the expense of high skill requirement vacancies and alter the propor-
tion of such jobs in equilibrium.
Albrecht and Vroman (2002, henceforth AV) is a leading example
of a model which can generate mismatch.2 They argue that equilibria
1For example, interaction eﬀects may arise from complementarity, in the final good
production function, between intermediate inputs produced by each skill group.
2Their simple, intuitively appealing framework melds the dynamic concerns of
the equilibrium unemployment literature with the static concerns of the literature
on assortative matching. Two other distinct frameworks have been used to examine
the eﬀect of matching frictions on labour market inequalities. In one, typified by
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), workers with diﬀerent skill levels operate in sepa-
rate labour markets. Mismatch is ruled out explicitly, and interaction between skill
types is driven instead by the extent to which they are complements in final goods
production. This is the same mechanism at work in models with frictionless labour
markets. An alternative, exemplified by Marimon and Zillibotti (1999), considers
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exhibiting either mismatch or segmentation by skills may arise in such
a setting;3 multiple equilibria may arise also. Their model has been
applied to a range of issues.4 However, empirical evaluation has been
limited.
We contribute to the study of skill-specific mismatch in understand-
ing labour market inequalities in two ways. Firstly, on the theoretical
side, we show that, neither of the candidate equilibria which AV identify
(with or without mismatch) exist under the assumptions adopted by AV
(and the subsequent literature). This is because in the AV framework
firms are unable to commit to hold open a job with a specific skill-
requirement, and encounter workers of either skill level. Instead they
find it optimal to regrade vacancies to suit the workers they encounter.5
We then modify the basic AV model so that the firm commits to hold
open a job of a particular skill-requirememt through the payment of a
sunk cost at the time that the unfilled vacancy is first opened.6 Then
mismatch in a continuum of skill types on both sides of the market. AV’s approach
is closer to the theoretical framework underpinning the empirical literature on skill-
biased technical change and is the subject of more extensive related literature.
3Their mismatch based equilibrium arises if high-skilled workers find it optimal to
match with a vacancy with low skill-requirements, while the segmentation equilibrium
arises if high-skilled workers would turn down this opportunity to form a match with
a low skill-requirement vacancy in favour of continued search. This diﬀers from the
ex ante segmentation described in the opening paragraph, in which search by firms
and workers occurs in skill-specific pools.
4Other authors have explored the eﬃciency properties of the resulting equilibrium,
Blasquez and Jansen (2008), and applied their framework to study on-the-job search,
Dolado et al. (2008), trade, specialisation and oﬀshoring, Davidson et al. (2008) and
economic fluctuations, Khalifa (2008).
5To see this, consider a firm which has opened a low-skill requirement vacancy.
In common with much of the literature on equilibrium unemployment, AV assume
that firms make a flow payment, at each point in time, to hold open a vacancy.
But then, if such a firm encounters a high-skilled worker, it faces no cost associated
with upgrading the skill-requirement of the vacancy to suit the high-skilled worker,
while the surplus from upgrading exceeds either that from maintaining the original
low skill-requirement job and engaging in mismatch, or from rejecting the match and
continuing to search for a suitable worker -as would arise in the equilibrium with
segmentation. In addition, it is possible that high-skill requirement vacancies may
be downgraded if a firm meets a low skilled worker.
6This sunk cost can be thought of as the cost of undertaking the investment re-
quired to introduce a skill-specific production technology. This is consistent with
observations that investment activity is lumpy and irreversible and that labour ad-
justment decisions are correlated with investment activity.
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mismatch equilibria and segmentation equilibria similar to those stud-
ied by AV and others re-emerge as part of a much richer set of feasible
equilibria, which includes several equilibria exhibiting regrading.7 We
characterise these equilibria and explain how, for given values of para-
meters, the nature of the equilibrium exhibited by the model depends
directly on the magnitude of the sunk cost of opening a vacancy.
We also contribute to the empirical analysis of models of mismatch.
Existing empirical analysis takes the existence of an empirically plausi-
ble equilibrium with mismatch as given; it cannot be construed as a test
of the model framework. Here, by contrast, the focus is directed towards
testing the model, to investigate which, if any of the equilibria gener-
ated by the model is consistent with the data.8 We identify two related
problems with previous empirical work. First, authors tend to target
unobserved, poorly identified or poorly measured parameters, such as
vacancy costs, the value of leisure and skill-specific productivity diﬀer-
ences but are then unable to match key obervables such as skill-specific
unemployment rates unless further free parameters are introduced. Such
an approach cannot be used for model evaluation, as it presupposes the
validity of the model. Secondly, the equilibrium of particular interest
here, mismatch, arises in a frictional model of equilibrium unemploy-
ment with skill-specific heterogeneity. As such, at the bare minimum
the model should be capable of matching observable unemployment and
skill premium data. Therefore, we calibrate the model with fixed costs
7As well as equilibria exhibiting mismatch or segmentation (each without regrad-
ing), akin to those studied by AV, the set of feasible equilibria includes a further
mismatch equilibrium, featuring downgrading of high-skill requirement jobs upon en-
countering low skill workers, additional segmentation equilibria can arise either with
upgrading of low skill-requirement jobs, or with downgrading of low skill-requirement
jobs or with regrading of both high and low skill-requirement jobs.
8One response to the state of the empirical analysis of the AV framework is that
it is primarily designed to give insight rather than being an empirical construct,
after all the two-skill framework is clearly restrictive, skill is unlikely to be binary, or
even unidimensional.. However, the two skill set up is consistent with the approach
adopted in the frictionless literature, see Acemoglu and Autor (2010). This argument
that the AV model was not intended to be taken to the data is rather undermined in
the literature by the work of Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2008),
Khalifa (2008) and others who choose ’plausible’ values for the model parameters for
their numerical work.
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of vacancy creation to match observable features of US data, such as
skill specific unemployment rates and wage premia, and use the equilib-
rium conditions (specific to each of the candidate equilibria) to pin down
unobserved, poorly identified or poorly measured parameters. We then
proceed to ask: if we insist on matching these observable features of the
data, are there any combinations of unobservable parameters for which
any of the candidate equilibria exist? And, if so, does the data support
the existence of mismatch in the context of the AV model? That is, un-
like earlier work, this approach permits us to examine the validity of any
candidate equilibria in the AV class of models as a means of accounting
for the data, and provides a direct test of whether the AVmodel provides
an empirically plausible model of mismatch.9 We find that, for US data,
the answers to these two questions are yes, and no, respectively. The
equilibria which are supported by the data turn out to be segmentation
without regrading (for low worker bargaining power) and segmentation
with upgrading (for high worker bargaining power). This result is robust
to a number of plausible variations in model specification. We also inves-
tigate why the mismatch equilibrium, although computationally feasible,
fails to satisfy the necessary conditions for existence. At the more empir-
ically plausible low values for worker bargaining power, the critical issue
is whether high skilled workers prefer mismatch to segmentation. Using
our calibration strategy, the critical result is that the calibrated value of
leisure in the mismatch equilibrium is so high that it is never worthwhile
for a high-skilled worker to undertake mismatch; the high-skilled worker
always prefers to continue to search for a high skill-requirement position.
To the extent that one views skill-based mismatch to be an important
phenomenon, an alternative to the AV model is required.
Finally, our strategy deals with the diﬃculties posed bymultiple equi-
libria, which AV (and others) claimed were an outcome of their model.
The existence of multiple equilibria would make empirical analysis more
diﬃcult to undertake. We show that multiple equilibria are an artefact
9We do not question the existence or significance of mismatch as an empirical
phenomenon. Rather, this is a model specific question: Is the equilibrium of an AV
model exhibiting mismatch without regrading, capable of accounting for obserbale
patterns in US labour market data?
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of the calibration framework adopted by both AV, and subsequent work.
For example, when considering the existence of the equilibrium with seg-
mentation one must check the following necessary condition: that in the
candidate equilibrium a firm with a low skill requirement vacancy would
prefer to continue to search (for a low-skilled individual) against the al-
ternative equilibrium that they engage in mismatch with a high-skilled
worker). This calculation uses the value of unemployment for a high-
skilled worker. I argue that AV and others claim the existence of multiple
equilibria because they use an inappropriate value of unemployment for
the high skill worker. In particular they evaluate the alternative equi-
librium (mismatch) using the value of unemployment that arises for the
candidate equilibrium. It is this that generates ranges of parameters for
which both mismatch and segmentation are feasible. Instead, I argue
that the alternative equilibrium (against which one evaluates a candi-
date equilibrium) should be evaluated using the values of variables that
would result if that alternative equilibrium occurred. As such multiple
equilibria are infeasible.
In the next section, I outline the theoretical model, demonstrate the
result that the equilibria studied to date in the literature do not exist,
and characterise the equilibria which do exist once costs of skill-specific
technology adoption are introduced. Section 3 illustrates the impact
of fixed costs of technology adoption on the existence of the various
equilibria that can arise. Section 4 outlines the calibration strategy in
detail, while Section 5 describes the key results. Section 6 concludes and
oﬀers suggestions for further work
2 A Model of Technology Adoption and Mismatch.
Consider a model in which workers exhibit skill-diﬀerences, jobs exhibit
diﬀerent skill requirements, and firms face fixed costs of vacancy creation.
This generalises AV (2002) by allowing for a one-oﬀ sunk cost associated
with creating a vacancy with a specific skill-requirement. This may pre-
vent a firm changing the technology (or skill-requirement) associated
with its job to suit the skill level of the first worker with whom it makes
contact. I show that this model with sunk vacancy creation costs has
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a large variety of equilibria which may involve mismatch, segmentation
and regrading.10 I show that equilibria (without regrading) featuring
mismatch or segmentation, which have been the focus of the current
literature, are infeasible under the maintained assumption of that lit-
erature, namely that the costs of adopting a skill specific technology
are zero.11 I show that the existence of a particular type of equilib-
rium depends on the magnitude of the costs of adopting the technology
associated with a particular skill type.
2.1 Basic Setup
Consider a continuous-time model with infinitely-lived, risk-neutral agents,
who discount the future at the interest rate r. The measure of workers
is normalised to one, a fraction µ of workers are low-skilled, (denoted by
the subscript L), the remainder, 1− µ, are high-skilled, (denoted by H).
The final good, Y is produced by combining intermediate skill-specific
outputs according to the production function12
Y = AHYH +ALYL,
where Aj, j ∈ {L,H} represents the eﬃciency with which intermediate
good produced using a technology with minimum skill-requirement j
10The most interesting among these equilibria involve i) mismatch without regrad-
ing, ii) segmentation without regrading, iii) segmentation with upgrading, in which
low-skill requirement jobs can be upgraded to high-skill requirement jobs, and iv)
segmentation with downgrading in which high-skill requirement jobs may be down-
graded to low-skill requirement jobs.
11To see this, consider a firm which has opened a low-skill requirement vacancy.
In common with much of the literature on equilibrium unemployment, AV assume
that firms make a flow payment, at each point in time, to hold open a vacancy. But
then, if such a firm encounters a high-skilled worker, it faces no costs associated with
upgrading the skill-requirement of the vacancy to suit the high-skilled worker, while
the surplus from upgrading exceeds both that from maintaining the original low skill-
requirement job and engaging in mismatch, and that from rejecting the match and
continuing to search for a suitable worker (as would occur in the equilibrium with
segmentation). In addition, it is possible that high-skill requirement vacancies may
be downgraded if a firm meets a low skilled worker.
12This production function assume that the output of high-skill requirement and
low skill requirement positions are perfect substitutes in the production of final goods.
This eliminates interaction eﬀects between skilled and unskilled workers associated
with the structure of the final goods production function and allow us to focus on
interaction arising through labour market frictions.
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can be used in final good production . This captures the productivity of
employment in an activity with a particular skill-requirement. I assume
that the eﬃciency of high-skilled workers exceeds that of low skilled
workers AH > AL. If final good producers are price takers in their
product market and in the markets for intermediate goods, then the
maximisation problem for final goods producers can be written as
max
YL,YH
PY − pLYL − pHYH ,
where pj, j ∈ {L,H} represents the relative price of intermediate good
j. Then, provided both high and low skill intermediate outputs are
produced, pH/pL = AH/AL > 1.13
A job is either vacant or filled. A job is characterised by its skill
requirement, that is, by the minimum skill required of a worker who is to
undertake the job. When a vacancy is filled, 1 unit of skill—requirement
specific intermediate good, Yi,j, is produced whenever the skill level, i, of
the worker is greater than or equal to the minimum skill-requirement, j,
of the job, otherwise no (intermediate) output can be produced.14 This
intermediate good production technology is represented as:
Yi,j ≡ Yj =
(
0 if i = L, j = H
1 otherwise
. (1)
Both low-skilled and high-skilled unemployed workers search in a
common pool, of measure, u, to find a vacancy (regardless of its skill
requirement). Firms with vacancies also search in a common pool, of
13As an alternative one could assume that a match producing type j output pro-
duces Aj units of output. The structure given in the text is adopted because of the
ease with which it can be generalised to the case where skill-specific intermediate
goods are imperfect substitutes in production.
14AV assume that the skill-requirement of a job is a non-negative number which
is chosen by the firm. Yet, given the available production technology and the distri-
bution of skills across workers, the only skill-requirements that any firm creating a
vacancy would choose are 1) the skill requirement of a low skill job will equal the skill
level of low skilled worker, and 2) the skill requirement of a high-skilled job = the skill
level of high-skilled workers. The framework described in the text generates these
outcomes and also provides a tractable approach in the face of imperfect substitution
between skill-requirement specific intermediate outputs in final goods production.
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measure v, for unemployed workers. The random matching technology
is described by the matching function m (u, v), which is linearly ho-
mogeneous, so that m (u, v) = vm
¡
1
θ , 1
¢
= vq (θ), where θ = vu , with
∂q
∂θ < 0. Vacancies meet workers at the rate q (θ) . Vacancies for high
skill-requirement positions sometimes encounter low-skilled workers who
are not qualified for those jobs. Suppose a fraction γ of all unemployed
workers are low-skilled, then the eﬀective arrival rate for high-skilled
vacancies is [1− γ] q (θ). The rate at which unemployed workers of all
types meet vacancies is θq (θ) . Although low-skilled workers encounter
vacancies at the same rate as do high-skilled workers, they are not qual-
ified for employment in jobs with high-skill requirements. The eﬀective
arrival rate of vacancies is φθq (θ) , where φ the fraction of vacancies
which are for low skill-requirement jobs.
When a vacant job is created, the firm chooses the skill requirement
to maximise the value of that vacancy, so that search by firms is di-
rected. The choice of a specific skill requirement entails a one oﬀ cost,
which can be thought of as the cost of adopting a skill-specific production
technology. This cost is sunk. Initially, assume that this cost of vacancy
creation, K, is independent of the level of skill-requirement that a firm
chooses. The number of vacancies at each skill-requirement is deter-
mined by a free entry condition, so that new vacancies with a particular
skill-requirement continue to be created until the value of that vacancy,
Vj, j ∈ {L,H} equals, K, the fixed cost of adopting the associated tech-
nology.15 The presence of a fixed cost of opening a vacancy of particular
type acts as a commitment device. If adopting a skill-specific technol-
ogy entails a sunk cost, then a firm which encounters a worker whose
skill-level diﬀers from the skill-requirement of the position on oﬀer, will
only regrade the job and adopt the technology specific to that worker if
the value of doing so outweighs the sunk cost incurred by so doing. By
contrast, if flow costs of posting vacancies are incurred per unit time, as
in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework, then, with heteroge-
15The lump sum structure could be easily justified given the lack of detailed knowl-
edge over the structure of adjustment costs generally. Fujita and Ramey (2007) show
lump-sum costs of vacancy creation generate vacancy persistence in a Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides matching model of equilibrium unemployment.
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neous workers, a firm will always regrade and adopt the technology most
appropriate to the first worker that it meets, since regrading is costless,
and provides a higher payoﬀ than the alternatives.
To facilitate comparison with the existing literature, we assume that,
besides the sunk cost of technology adoption, K, firms pay a flow fixed
cost, c, per unit time, to hold open a vacancy; again we do not allow
c to be skill-specific. We also follow Albrecht and Vroman and assume
both that production entails a flow cost, κ. Then Albrecht and Vroman’s
model is a special case (in which K = 0, and κ = c) of our more general
model.
2.2 Match Formation and Wage Determination
Broadly speaking we need to characterise equilibria with mismatch and
equilibria with segmentation; this is complicated by the fact that either
of these situations may involve regrading of low-skill requirement and/or
high skill-requirement jobs. We focus on the steady state.
2.2.1 The Surplus and the Conditions for Match Formation
Once we allow the possibility of regrading, a meeting between an unem-
ployed worker with skill level i and a firm which has created a vacancy
with skill requirement j results in the formation of an employment re-
lationship under two alternative sets of conditions.16 First, if no re-
grading occurs, then the joint surplus, Si,j, generated by this match
(absent regrading) must be non-negative and must exceed the surplus,
Ski,i, that can be obtained if the skill-requirement of the vacancy is re-
graded to match the skill-level of the unemployed worker whom the firm
has met.17 These conditions require Si,j ≥ max
©
Ski,i, 0
ª
. Secondly, if a
match arises as a result of regrading, then the surplus, Ski,i, must be non-
negative and must exceed the surplus Si,j, that arises without regrading,
Ski,i ≥ max {Si,j, 0}.
To proceed we evaluate these match formation conditions in terms of
the capital value of the transition involved in match formation for each
16By contrast AV, who ignore the possibility of regrading, argue that match for-
mation requires only one, less restrictive, condition Si,j ≥ 0.
17Here k ∈ {Up,Down}, allows for both upgrades and downgrades.
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party to the match. We use the following notation for the value functions
pertaining to workers and firms associated with particular states. The
value of unemployment for a worker of type i is Ui. The value of employ-
ment for a worker of skill-level i in a job with skill-requirement j is Wi,j,
in the absence of regrading and W ki,i if the skill-requirement j position
is regraded once a type i worker is encountered. This notation diﬀer-
entiates between values with and without regrading. For example WL,L
and WDownL,L both refer to the value of an low skilled worker employed in
a low skill-requirement job, and both arise in the same equilibrium (e.g.
segmentation with downgrading), but WL,L is the value to a low skilled
worker of employment in a position that was originally created as a low
skilled position, whereas WDownL,L refers to the value of a worker in the
case in which the vacancy was originally a high skill-requirement posi-
tion, but was downgraded to match the skills of the low-skilled worker.18
The value of a vacancy for a job with skill-requirement j is Vj and the
value to a firm of a job with skill requirement j filled by a worker of
skill level i is Ji,j, in the absence of regrading and Jki,i when regrading
occurs.19
Using this notation and the definition of the surplus, we write a
necessary condition for match formation without regrading as (2) and a
necessary condition for match formation with regrading as (3), reflecting
the sunk cost of regrading the job.
Si,j ≡Wi,j + Ji,j − Ui − Vj ≥ max
©
Skii, 0
ª
(2)
Ski,i≡W ki,i + Jki,i −K − Ui − Vj ≥ max {Sij, 0} . (3)
2.2.2 Bargaining and Wages
Suppose, as is standard, that the wage in a viable match is determined by
Nash Bargaining. Then, without regrading, the wage wi,j for a worker
18Of course all these value functions, Ui ,Wi,j , Ji,j etc. will vary across equilibria,
depending in part on whether regrading occurs. Rather than introduce that extra
notational complexity, the notation here distinguishes simply between the value of
diﬀerent states which may arise within the same equilibrium.
19The free entry condition drives the value of all vacancies to VL = VH = K,
irrespective of regrading.
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with skill level i in a job with skill requirement j firm, is determined by
the condition (4), which apportions to the worker a share β of the surplus
Si,j. If regrading occurs, the wage, wkii, is determined by condition, (5).
Wi,j − Ui=β [Wi,j + Ji,j − Ui − Vj] (4)
W ki,i − Ui=β
£
W ki,i + J
k
i,i −K − Ui − Vj
¤
(5)
Next, define the asset value equations of workers and firms (which
generalise those of AV). We focus on the steady state. A low skill re-
quirement vacancy has value
rVL = −c+ q (θ)
"
γ [JL,L − VL] +
[1− γ]max
n
0, JH,L − VL, JUpH,H −K − VL
o# . (6)
Equation (6) says that the flow return to a vacancy for a low-skill re-
quirement job is the sum of the flow cost per unit time of posting a
such a vacancy, −c and the expected capital gain from forming a match.
This second term is the weighted value of filling the vacancy, where
the weights reflect the arrival rates of low-skilled workers, γq (θ) , and a
high-skilled workers, [1− γ] q (θ), respectively. An encounter with a low-
skilled worker results in a match which produces a capital gain JLL−VL.
If the firm encounters a high-skilled worker, it chooses the most valuable
of the several options available. In particular, a capital gain of 0 re-
sults if the high-skilled worker does not find it worthwhile to undertake
employment in a low skill requirement job and the firm does not find
it optimal to upgrade the skill requirements of the job to that of the
work; the capital gain JH,L − VL represents the payoﬀ when the high-
skilled worker finds it worthwhile to undertake employment in the low
skill-requirement position while firms find it too costly to upgrade the
skill-requirements of the job to match the skill level of the worker. The
term JUpH,H −K − VL represents the capital gain when firms upgrade the
11
skill requirements of the job to match the skill level of the worker.20 21
For a high skill-requirement vacancy, the asset value satisfies:
rVH = −c+ q (θ)
"
γmax
©
JDownL,L −K − VH , 0
ª
+ [1− γ] [JH.H − VH ]
#
. (7)
That is, the return on a high skill-requirement vacancy is the sum of the
flow cost of posting the vacancy, −c, and the expected instantaneous
capital gain from forming a match, which is the weighted value of filling
the vacancy. These weights γq (θ) and [1− γ] q (θ), reflect the arrival
rates of low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers, respectively. An
encounter with a low-skilled worker results in a match which produces
a capital gain JLL − VL. In the event of meeting a high-skilled worker
the firm chooses the most profitable of the several options available. In
particular, a capital gain of JDownL,L −K−VH results if the firm downgrades
the skill requirement of the job to match the skills of the low-skilled
worker; a capital gain of 0 results when downgrades are too costly, since
the production technology precludes a low skilled worker from producing
output in a high skill requirement task. An encounter with a high-skilled
worker results in a match which produces a capital gain JH,H − VH .22
The flow value, rJi,j, of a job with skill-requirement j filled by a
worker of skill-level i, without regrading, reflects the sum of the operating
profit flow, pj − c − wi,j (revenue, pj, less flow fixed costs of operation,
κ, and wages, wi,j) and the expected capital loss arising from exogenous
separation, δ [Vj − Ji,j]. This is summarised in equation (8). The value
to a firm of a job regraded to skill requirement i in order to suit a worker
of skill level i, is given by equation (9). In general Ji,i 6= Jki,i, because if
the cost of regrading, K, exceeds zero then surplus with regrading diﬀers
from that without, and the wage with regrading wki,i will diﬀer from that
20An equilibrium may exhibit both upgrading (of low skill requirement jobs) and
downgrading (of high skill requirement jobs), but then the decision on whether to
downgrade is made by a firm with a high-skill requirement vacancy. This is considered
in equation (7).
21AV, who do not consider the possibility of regrading, use the simpler condition
rVL = −c+ q (θ) [γ [JL,L − VL] + [1− γ]max {JH,L − VL, 0}].
22AV use the simpler condition rVH = −c+ q (θ) [1− γ] [JH.H − VH ].
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without regrading wi,i .
rJi,j = pj − c− wi,j + δ [Vj − Ji,j] (8)
rJki,i= pi − c− wki,i + δ
£
Vi − Jki,i
¤
(9)
For a level i-skilled worker, the value of employment, without re-
grading, in a job requiring skill j (provided {i, j} 6= {L,H}) is given in
equation (10). While the value of employment to a level i-skilled worker
in a regraded job requiring skill level i is summarised in (11). Again, if
K > 0, W ki,i 6=Wi,i; bargaining ensures that wki,i 6= wi,i.
rWi,j =wi,j + δ [Ui −Wi,j] . (10)
rW ki,i=w
k
i,i + δ
£
Ui −W ki,i
¤
(11)
Finally, consider the value of unemployment. For a high-skilled
worker the value of unemployment is the sum of the flow value of leisure,
b, and the expected capital gain from the possibility of forming an em-
ployment relationship. A high-skilled worker encounters a job with high
skill-requirement at a rate [1− φ] θq (θ), in that case the capital gain is
WH,H − UH . A high-skilled worker encounters vacant low skill require-
ment jobs at a rate φθq (θ). Then the firm decides whether or not to
upgrade the job to meet the skill level of the worker. So the expected
capital gains in that case are
Imax {WH,L − UH , 0}+ [1− I] max
n
WUpH,H − UH , 0
o
,
where I is an indicator function which denotes when the firm finds it op-
timal to regrade the vacancy, such that I = 1 if JH,L−VL ≥ JUpH,H−K−VL
and I = 0 otherwise. Here WH,L − UH represents the capital gain if
the firm decides not to upgrade the low skill-requirement job and the
high-skilled worker accepts it (and the gain if the high-skilled worker
rejects the upgraded job is 0), while WUpH,H − UH represents the capital
gain when the high-skilled worker decides to accept the regraded job
in the case that the firm does decide to upgrade the skill-requirements
of the job (and the capital gain if the worker rejects that upgraded
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job is 0). Clearly, a firm will only upgrade the skill-requirement of
the vacancy if the worker is going to accept the upgraded position.
Thus, the criterion that the firm uses to determine whether to up-
grade a low skill-requirement vacancy to a high skill-requirement va-
cancy, namely max
n
JH,L − VL, JUpH,H −K − VL, 0
o
can be written as
max
n
WH,L − UH ,WUpH,H − UH , 0
o
. So we write the asset value equation
of unemployment for high-skilled workers as (12), where (in relation to
AV) the possibility of regrading introduces WUpH,H − UH into the max
operation. By a similar line of argument the value of an unemployed
low skilled worker satisfies condition (13).
rUH = b+ θq (θ)
"
φmax
n
WH,L − UH ,WUpH,H − UH , 0
o
+ [1− φ] [WH,H − UH ]
#
, (12)
rUL= b+ θq (θ)
"
φ [WL,L − UL] +
[1− φ] max
©
WDownL,L − UL, 0
ª# . (13)
2.2.3 Match Formation, Wages and Capital Gains
We can substitute asset value conditions (8) and (10) into equation (2)
to re-express the match formation conditions in flow terms. Thus a
necessary condition for a match to be formed without regrading is (14).
Using (9) and (11) into (3), a necessary condition for match formation
on regrading from a skill requirement j vacancy to a skill requirement i
vacancy is (15)
pj − c≥ rUi + rVj, (14)
pi − c≥ rUi + rVi + [r + δ] [Vj −K − Vi] . (15)
Using conditions (8) and (10) in (4) the wage of a worker of type i
employed in a job with skill requirement j (in the absence of regrading)
is given by (16), while, combining (9) and (11) into (3) if regrading from
a skill requirement j to a skill-requirement i job occurs then the wage of
the type i worker is given by (17). Notice that regrading provides a new
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channel through which within-skill-group wage inequality may arise.
wi,j =β [pj − c− rVj] + [1− β] rUi, (16)
wki,i=β [pi − c− rVi + [r + δ] [Vi −K − Vj]] + [1− β] rUi. (17)
We also note the following capital gains for firms and workers, as a
result of the formation of a match, with regrading and without.
Ji,j − Vj =
[1− β] [pj − c− rVj − rUi]
r + δ
(18)
Wi,j − Ui=
β [pj − c− rVj − rUi]
r + δ
(19)
Jki,i −K − Vj =
[1− β] [pi − c− rVi − rUi + [r + δ] [Vi −K − Vj]]
r + δ
(20)
W ki,i − Ui=
β [pi − c− rVi − rUi + [r + δ] [Vi −K − Vj]]
r + δ
(21)
2.3 Equilibrium
We wish to characterise the equilibrium values of four endogenous vari-
ables, the aggregate unemployment rate, u, the fraction of the unem-
ployed who are low-skilled, γ, labour market tightness, θ, and the frac-
tion of vacancies which are for low skill requirement jobs, φ. The model
generates a number of equilibria of interest. We characterise these equi-
libria here. Under the assumption that K is a known parameter, the
nature of the equilibrium that arises depends on the magnitude of K,
the sunk cost of creating a vacancy for a job with a particular skill re-
quirement. Since the equilibrium with mismatch without regrading has
attracted the greatest attention, we begin by considering the impact
of fixed costs on this equilibrium in order to tease out the similarities
with and diﬀerences to the earlier literature. AV refer to the former
case as a cross-skill-matching equilibrium, and to the case where no
mismatch occurs as an equilibrium with ex post segmentation; we fol-
low this notation. We also characterise four other interesting equilibria,
which feature i) segmentation with upgrading of low skill-requirement
jobs, ii) segmentation with downgrading of high skill-requirement jobs
(only), iii) segmentation with both upgrading of low skill-requirement
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jobs and downgrading of high skill-requirement jobs, and iv) mismatch
with downgrading of high skill-requirement jobs.23
2.3.1 Mismatch Without Regrading
To rule out regrading we require that (i) JH,L− VL > JUpH,H −K − VL to
rule out upgrading and (ii) 0 > JDownL,L −K−VH to rule out downgrading.
In addition to AV’s condition for the existence of an equilibrium with
mismatch holds: JH,L − VL > 0.
Equilibrium Conditions The equilibrium is pinned down by two
mass balance conditions, one for high skilled workers and one for low
skilled workers, and two free entry conditions, one for jobs with high
skill requirements and one for jobs with low skill requirements.24
For low-skilled workers the flow of workers from unemployment into
employment through match formation must equal the flow from em-
ployment to unemployment through separations. This is summarised in
equation (22). Total separations for low-skilled workers (per unit time)
are the product of the separation rate, δ, and the mass of low-skilled
workers in employment, µ − γu.25 The outflow of low-skilled workers
to employment is the product of the rate at which low-skilled work-
ers encounter suitable employment opportunities (jobs with low skill-
requirements), φθq (θ) and the mass of low skilled unemployed workers,
γu. For high-skilled workers the equivalent equation, (23), is obtained
23In addition when the costs of technology adoption are suﬃciently high, there
are two further equilibria: i) those with no low-skill requirement jobs, in which even
low-skilled individuals do not find it worthwhile to undertake low skill-requirement
jobs and ii) those with no feasible jobs whatever (in which both skilled and unskilled
workers prefer unemployment). These equilibria are somewhat less plausible and less
interesting, so I do not discuss them. However, they do generate further necessary
conditions that a candidate equilibrium must satisfy; these necessary conditions are
exploited in the empirical analysis.
24While the labour market flow conditions are identical to those of AV, the free
entry conditions diﬀer in that they allow for the costs of skill-specific technology
adoption, K.
25This is the measure of low-skilled workers in the workforce less the number of
low-skilled workers who are unemployed, γu. This, in turn, is the product of unem-
ployment and the fraction of the unemployed who are low-skilled of the workforce
who are low skilled.
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by a similar argument.
φθq (θ) γu= δ [µ− γu] . (22)
θq (θ) [1− γ]u= δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] (23)
Next, consider the free entry conditions. Using (18) the asset value
equations for low skill requirement and high-skill requirement vacancies
(6) and (7) can be written as
[r + δ] [rVL + c] = [1− β] q (θ) [pL − κ− rVL − γrUL − [1− γ] rUH ](24)
[r + δ] [rVH + c] = [1− β] q (θ) [1− γ] [pH − κ− rVH − rUH ] (25)
To proceed we need to eliminate rUi from (24) and (25). The value of
unemployment for low-skilled individuals is obtained using (13) and (19)
to give (26). Similarly for high-skilled individuals, equations (12) and
(19) give (27)
rUL=
[r + δ] b+ βφθq (θ) [pL − κ− rVL]
r + δ + βφθq (θ)
(26)
rUH =
[r + δ] b+ βθq (θ)
"
φ [pL − κ− rVL] +
[1− φ] [pH − κ− rVH ]
#
r + δ + βθq (θ)
(27)
The two free entry conditions require the value of a vacancy (of either
skill requirement) equal the sunk cost of technology adoption. That is
VL = K, VH = K. (28)
We follow AV (2002) in exploiting the equal value feature of the free
entry conditions (i.e. VH = VL) by combining (24) and (25) to give
[1− γ] [pH − pL] = γ [pL − κ− rK − rUL]
Using (26), pL − κ − rK − rUL = [r+δ][pL−κ−rK−b]r+δ+βφθq(θ) . So the equal value
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condition can be re-expressed as (29)
[1− γ]
"
[pH − pL]βφθq (θ)+
[r + δ] [pH − κ− rK − b]
#
= [r + δ] [pL − κ− rK − b] (29)
For high skill-requirement jobs, substituting the free entry condition
VH = K in (25) yields
[r + δ] [rK + c] = [1− β] q (θ) [1− γ] [pH − κ− rK − rUH ]
Using (27) we see that pH −κ− rK− rUH = [r+δ][pL−κ−rK−b][1−γ][r+δ+βθq(θ)] , so the free
entry condition to high skill-requirement jobs can be written
[rK + c] = [1− β] q (θ) [pL − κ− rK − b]
[r + δ + βθq (θ)]
(30)
Conditions (??), (23), (29) and (30) governing the equilibrium with mis-
match take the same general form as those in AV (2002). In the limit as
K → 0, the equilibrium conditions become identical to AV.
Necessary Conditions Next, we need to establish necessary condi-
tions for the existence of an equilibrium featuring mismatch without re-
grading for arbitrary K ≥ 0. For this equilibrium to exist, we must rule
out equilibria in which segmentation occurs and also rule out those with
regrading. To rule out regrading, we must rule out both the upgrading of
low skill-requirement jobs and the downgrading of high skill-requirement
jobs. To rule out segmentation we require that the surplus from a match
between a high skilled worker and a low-skill requirement job be positive:
JH,L − VL ≥ 0 or equivalently;26
pL − κ− rK − rUH ≥ 0. (31)
To rule out upgrading, a firm with a low skill-requirement vacancy must,
on meeting a high-skilled worker, make a greater capital gain through
26I do not substitute for rUi, i ∈ {H,L} in this section. It turns out that whether
rUi is evaluated with the parameter values from the candidate equilibrium, or with
parameter values for the alternative equilibrium determines whether multiple equi-
libria arise in the model, see Section 3 below.
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mismatch at the existing skill requirement than by paying K to upgrade
the vacancy by adopting the technology suitable for high skill require-
ment workers. This amounts to the condition JH,L−VL > JUpH,H−K−VL.
Using (18), (20) and the free entry conditions gives
pL − κ− rK − rUH > pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH . (32)
To rule out downgrading, a firm with a high skill-requirement vacancy,
on encountering a low-skilled worker, must not make a greater capital
gain by incurring the cost K of adopting the skill requirement suitable
to the low-skilled worker and forming the match, than by retaining the
high-skill requirement vacancy and continuing to search for a high-skilled
worker.27 This is summarised by the condition JDownL,L − K − VH < 0.
Using (20) and the free entry conditions gives
pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL < 0 (33)
Notice that in the limit case, as K → 0, condition (32) ruling out
upgrades is violated, and condition (33) ruling out downgrades is only
satisfied if low skill requirement matches are suﬃciently unprofitable
that they are never formed (even without regrades). In other words, for
the limit case, K = 0, considered by AV, the equilibrium with mismatch
without regrading can not exist. Regrading occurs instead.
Summary Once the possibility of regrading is admitted, an equilib-
rium with mismatch is characterised by equations (22), (23), (29) and
(30) subject to conditions (31), (32) and (33). The wage premium (of
high-skilled workers over low-skilled workers) is then given by (34), in
which the individual wi,j are determined using (16). Here within-skill-
group wage inequality arises because of mismatch.
wp =
φwH,L + [1− φ]wH,H
wL,L
(34)
27If this latter condition fails then an alternative equilibrium arises featuring mis-
match with downgrading - see below. However, it appears likely that such an outcome
can be ruled out on empirical grounds.
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Finally, to ensure that both low-skill workers and high-skilled workers
are willing to undertake employment (at all) we require
pL − κ− rK − rUL≥ 0 (35)
pH − κ− rK − rUH ≥ 0 (36)
2.3.2 Segmentation Without Regrading
Necessary Conditions An equilibrium featuring segmentation with-
out regrading diﬀers from that studied in the previous section in one
key way: a high-skilled worker rejects any low skill-requirement posi-
tion that he/she encounters. This necessary condition can be written as
JH,L − VL < 0. Using (18) and the free entry condition (28) this can be
written as (37). Although (37) was considered in isolation by AV, the
need to rule out regrading was not. An absence of regrading requires (i)
that upgrading a low skill-requirement vacancy on encountering a high
skill requirement vacancy generates a loss, and (ii) that downgrading
a high skill-requirement vacancy on encountering a low-skilled worker
generates a loss. That is (i) JUpH,H −K − VL < 0, or equation (38), and
(ii) JDownL,L −K − VH < 0, or equation (39).
0>pL − κ− rK − rUH (37)
0>pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH (38)
0>pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL (39)
Once again the AV equilibrium is infeasible in the limit case, K → 0.
Letting K → 0, (37) collapses to AV’s necessary condition, but (38),
which rules out upgrades fails (except in the uninteresting and implau-
sible case in which high-skilled workers will not undertake employment
in high-skill requirement jobs), while (39), which rules out downgrades
also fails (except when low skilled workers refuse to undertake low skill-
requirement jobs. The equilibrium is again characterised by four equa-
tions: two mass balance equations (one for each type of worker) and one
free entry condition for vacancies of each skill-requirement, reflecting the
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cost of skill-specific technology adoption.28
Equilibrium When conditions (37)-(39) are satisfied, workers of each
type never mismatch and no regrading occurs. It follows that the mass
balance equation, (40), for low-skilled workers is the same as the case
of mismatch without regrading considered in Section (2.3.1). Com-
pared with the equilibrium exhibiting mismatch without regrading, out-
flows of high-skilled workers from unemployment occur at the lower rate
[1− φ] θq (θ), since high-skilled workers do not take up employment when
they encounter low skill-requirement positions. So the mass balance
equation for high-skilled workers under ex post segmentation without
regrading is (41).
φθq (θ) γu= δ [µ− γu] (40)
[1− φ] θq (θ) [1− γ]u= δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] (41)
The asset value equations for vacancies and unemployed workers are
rVL=−c+
[1− β] q (θ) γ [pL − c− rVL − rUL]
r + δ
, (42)
rVH =−c+
[1− β] q (θ) [1− γ] [pH − c− rVH − rUH ]
r + δ
(43)
rUL=
[r + δ] b+ βφθq (θ) [pL − c− rVL]
r + δ + βφθq (θ)
(44)
rUH =
[r + δ] b+ [1− φ]βθq (θ) [pH − c− rVH ]
r + δ + [1− φ]βθq (θ) (45)
The two free entry conditions require the value of a vacancy (for either
skill-requirement) equal the sunk cost of vacancy creation, VL = VH = K.
Combining this information with (42), (43), (44) and (45) the free entry
condition for vacancies for low skill requirement positions becomes:
rK + c = [1− β] q (θ) γ [pL − c− rK − b]
r + δ + βφθq (θ)
; (46)
28These pin down unemployment, u, the fraction of the unemployed who are low-
skilled, γ, overall labour market tightness, θ, and the fraction of vacancies which
correspond to low skill-requirement positions, φ.
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while the free entry condition in vacancies for high skill requirement
positions becomes
rK + c = [1− β] q (θ) [1− γ] [pH − c− rK − b]
r + δ + β [1− φ] θq (θ) . (47)
Summary So segmentation without regrading is characterised by equa-
tions (40), (41), (46) and (47), subject to the constraints, (37), (38) and
(39). The wage premium in this case is given by (48), where the match
specific wages are given by (16)
wp =
wH,H
wL,L
(48)
2.3.3 Segmentation With Upgrading
Necessary Conditions An equilibrium featuring segmentation with
upgrading arises when i) a firm with a low skill requirement jobs which
encounters a high-skilled worker decides to pay the fixed cost, K, of
technology adoption to raise the skill-requirement of the job to suit
that worker, and ii) a high skill-requirement vacancy is not downgraded
if a low-skilled worker is encountered. That is, we require not only
max
n
JH,L − VL, JUpH,H −K − VL, 0
o
= JUpH,H−K−VL, but alsomax
©
JDownL,L −K − VH , 0
ª
= 0. Notice that when an equilibrium with segmentation and upgrading
arises, the alternative equilibrium without regrading may exhibit mis-
match or segmentation depending on whether JH,L − V ≷ 0. Therefore,
the necessary conditions to ensure upgrading rather than mismatch or
segmentation (when a firm with a low skill requirement job encounters a
high-skilled worker) are JUpH,H−K−VL ≥ JH,L−VL and J
Up
H,H−K−VL ≥ 0.
To rule out downgrading we require JDownL,L −K−VH < 0. Using the free
entry conditions VL = K and VH = K, in conjunction with equations
(18) and (20), these necessary conditions become, respectively:
pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH ≥ pL − κ− rK − rUH (49)
pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH ≥ 0 (50)
0>pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL (51)
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Equilibrium Equilibrium is characterised by two mass balance equa-
tions (one for each type of worker) and two free entry conditions for
vacancies, one for each skill-requirement.
Outflows of high-skilled workers from unemployment occur at the
rate θq (θ), since, with job upgrading, such workers take up employment
in high skill-requirement jobs whether or not the vacancies were initially
created as high skill-requirement positions. So the mass balance equation
for flows of high-skilled workers is (52). The fact that low-skilled workers
only match with vacancies which were originally created as low skill-
requirement positions, means that the mass balance equation, (53), for
low skilled workers is the same as in the equilibria without regrading
discussed in preceding sections:
θq (θ) [1− γ]u= δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] (52)
φθq (θ) γu= δ [µ− γu] . (53)
In an equilibrium with upgrading the asset value equation for a low
skill requirement vacancy diﬀers from the previous cases
rVL = −c+ q (θ)
h
γ [JLL − VL] + [1− γ]
h
JUpH,H −K − VL
ii
.
The flow value of such a vacancy still reflects the product of the prob-
ability that an encounter with a worker arises and the expected capital
gain associated with a given match. However, now, on meeting a high-
skilled worker, whose arrival rate is [1− γ] θq (θ), a firm makes capital
gain JUpH,H −K − VL, by upgrading to a high skill-requirement technol-
ogy and forming the match. Using (18) and (20) the asset value of a
low skill-requirement vacancy can be written as (54). The flow value
of a high skill-requirement vacancy, (55), takes the same form as in the
cases without regrading considered in previous sections, since upgrading
of low skill-requirement vacancies does not imply downgrading of high
23
skill-requirement vacancies:
[rVL − c] =
[1− β]
[r + δ]
q (θ)
⎡
⎢⎣
γ [pL − c− rVL − rUL] +
[1− γ]
"
pH − c− rVH − rUH+
[r + δ] [VH −K − VL]
#⎤⎥⎦ (54)
[rVH + c] =
[1− β]
[r + δ]
q (θ) [1− γ] [pH − c− rVH − rUH ] (55)
For a high-skilled worker, the value of unemployment reflects the
idea that all meetings generate employment in high skill requirement
positions. However, a fraction φ of such meetings lead the firm oﬀering
the vacancy to incur the cost, K, of upgrading its production technology
to suit the high skilled worker. In that case the capital gain available to
a worker is WUpH,H − UH . This is diﬀers from (and is likely lower than)
the capital gain obtained from employment in a high skill requirement
vacancy for which no upgrading cost was incurred, WH,H − UH . So
rUH = b+ θq (θ)
h
φ
h
WUpH,H − UH
i
+ [1− φ] [WH,H − UH ]
i
.
Substuting for WUpH,H −UH andWH,H −UH , via (21) and (19) gives (56).
rUH =
[r + δ] b+ βθq (θ)
"
pH − c− rVH+
φ [r + δ] [VH −K − VL]
#
[r + δ + βθq (θ)]
. (56)
For a low-skilled worker the form of the flow value of unemployment is
unaﬀected by the presence of upgrading, so it takes the same form as in
the previous two sections:
rUL =
[r + δ] b+ βφθq (θ) [pL − c− rVL]
r + δ + βφθq (θ)
. (57)
Now we impose the two free entry conditions, VL = K and VH = K.
We follow AV’s approach to the equilibrium featuring mismatch without
regrading and use the equal value condition VL = VH in conjunction
with a free entry condition for high-skill requirement vacancies VH = K.
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Combining these conditions with the asset value equations (54) and (55)
with the flow value of unemployment for each skill level, equations (56)
and (57), and then simplifying, gives the equal value condition (58) and
the free entry condition, (59), for high skill-requirement vacancies
γ [pL − c− rK − b] = [1− γ] [r + δ + βφθq (θ)]K. (58)
[rK + c] = [1− β] q (θ) [1− γ] pH − c− rK − b+ φβθq (θ)K
[r + δ + βθq (θ)]
. (59)
Summary So segmentation with upgrading is the solution to (52),
(53), (58) and (59), subject to the conditions, (49), (50) and (51). In
that case the skill premium is given by equation (60), where the terms
wi,j are determined by (16) and that in wki,j is given by (17). Wage
inequality across high-skill workers exists even though all end up in high
skill-requirement occupations. The cost of regrading a job is the source
of wage inequality within this environment.
wp =
φwUpH,H + [1− φ]wH,H
wL,L
(60)
2.3.4 Segmentation with Downgrading
Necessary Conditions Downgrading occurs when a firm with a va-
cancy for a high skill requirement position finds it optimal, on meet-
ing a low-skilled worker, to pay the fixed cost K to adopt the technol-
ogy of a low skill-requirement job. This is equivalent to the condition
JDownL,L − K − VH ≥ 0. If, in addition, meetings between high-skilled
workers and low skill-requirement jobs do not lead to employment re-
lationships then both mismatch and regrading must be ruled out when
such meetings occur. So the following conditions must both be satisfied
i) segmentation-not-mismatch requires 0 > JH,L − VL; ii) segmentation-
not-upgrading requires 0 > JUpH,H − K − VL. Using (18) (20) and the
free entry conditions VL = VH = K these necessary conditions can be
written more fully as (61), (62) and (63) respectively.
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pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL≥ 0 (61)
0>pL − κ− rK − rUH (62)
0>pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH (63)
Equilibrium To characterise the equilibrium we need one mass bal-
ance equation for each skill level of worker and one free entry condition
for each vacancy skill requirement level.
For low-skilled workers, contact with low skill-requirement vacancies
and high skill-requirement vacancies, which arrive at rates φθq (θ) and
[1− φ] θq (θ) respectively, both result in match formation. So the mass
balance equation is (64)
θq (θ) γu = δ [µ− γu] . (64)
An equilibrium featuring segmentation with (only) downgrading is
one in which a high skilled worker only enters a match if he/she encoun-
ters a high skill-requirement vacancy. So (65), the steady state mass
balance equation for high-skilled workers, is identical to that in the equi-
librium featuring segmentation without regrading described above:
[1− φ] θq (θ) [1− γ]u = δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] . (65)
To proceed we determine the flow values of vacancies and unemploy-
ment, which can be combined with free entry conditions. Since neither
upgrading nor mismatch occurs if a firm with a low skill-requirement
vacancy encounters a high-skilled worker, the asset value equation for
a low skill-requirement vacancy takes the same form as in the equilib-
rium featuring segmentation without regrading described earlier: rVL =
−c+ q (θ) γ [JL,L − VL]. Using (18) this can be written as
rVL + c =
[1− β]
[r + δ]
q (θ) γ [pL − κ− rVL − rUL] . (66)
The flow value of a high skill-requirement vacancy directly incorpo-
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rates the eﬀect of downgrading. If a firm with a high skill-requirement
vacancy encounters a low-skilled worker then the capital gain from form-
ing a match is JDownL.L −K−VH , but if it encounters a high-skilled worker
the capital gain is JH.H − VH . So:
rVH = −c+ q (θ)
£
γ
£
JDownL.L −K − VH
¤
+ [1− γ] [JH.H − VH ]
¤
.
which can be expressed as
rVH + c =
[1− β]
[r + δ]
q (θ)
⎡
⎢⎣
γ
"
pL − κ− rVL − rUL+
[r + δ] [VL −K − VH ]
#
+ [1− γ] [pH − κ− rVH − rUH ]
⎤
⎥⎦ . (67)
For low-skilled workers all encounters with firms result in match for-
mation, regardless of the (initial) skill-requirement of the vacancy. The
flow value of unemployment to a low-skilled worker reflects the flow in-
come from unemployment, b, the rate, φθq (θ), at which meetings occur
with firms oﬀering low skill-requirement vacancies multiplied by the as-
sociated capital gain, WL,L − UL, to a worker on forming that match,
and the product of the rate, [1− φ] θq (θ), at which low-skilled workers
encounter high skill-requirement vacancies which are downgraded to low
skill-requirement positions and the resulting capital gain WDownL,L − UL:
rUL = b+ θq (θ)
£
φ [WL,L − UL] + [1− φ]
£
WDownL,L − UL
¤¤
. Using (19)
and (21) this can be simplified to
rUL =
[r + δ] b+ βθq (θ)
"
pL − κ− rVL+
[1− φ] [r + δ] [VL −K − VH ]
#
r + δ + βθq (θ)
. (68)
For high-skilled workers, the value of unemployment reflects the fact
that only meetings with high skill-requirement vacancies generate em-
ployment. Such vacancies arise at the rate [1− φ] θq (θ), and, upon
match formation, yield the worker a capital gain of WH,H − UH . So
the asset value equation is rUH = b + θq (θ) [1− φ] [WH,H − UH ] .Using
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expression (19) this can be written as
rUH =
[r + δ] b+ [1− φ]βθq (θ) [pH − κ− rVH ]
r + δ + [1− φ]βθq (θ) . (69)
Now, using (68), substitute for rUL in the asset value equation (66)
and impose the free entry conditions VL = VH = K. Then the free entry
condition for low skill-requirement vacancies is equation (70)
rK + c =
[1− β] q (θ) γ [[pL − c− rK − b]− [1− φ]βθq (θ)K]
r + δ + βθq (θ)
(70)
Since VL = VH = K, the expressions (66) and (67) can be combined
to give
γ [r + δ]K = [1− γ] [pH − c− rK − rUH ]
Using (69) this simplifies to the condition
K =
[1− γ] [pH − c− b]
r + γ [δ + [1− φ]βθq (θ)] (71)
Summary So, in (64), (65), (70) and (71) we have four independent
equations in the four unknowns u,γ, θ and φ. For this equilibrium to ex-
ist the necessary conditions (61), (62) and (63) must be satisfied. Then
the wage premium will given by (72). In this equilibrium there is within-
group inequality between low-skilled workers, even though they can only
be employed in low-skill requirement jobs. These wage diﬀerences arise
because some low skilled workers form employment relationships with
regraded vacancies: vacancies which have been downgraded, having orig-
inally been involved high-skill requirements.
wp =
wH,H
φwL,L + [1− φ]wDownL,L
. (72)
2.3.5 Segmentation with Upgrading and Downgrading
As just discussed, when a firm with a high skill-requirement position en-
counters a low-skilled worker, downgrading requires JDownL,L −K−VH > 0.
If, in addition, a meeting between a high-skilled worker and a low skill-
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requirement job leads the firm to pay the fixed cost K to upgrade the
skill requirement of the job to suit that of the worker then the value
of upgrading must exceed that of the alternatives mismatch and seg-
mentation without upgrading. This requirement is summarised in the
conditions i) upgrading not-mismatch: JUpH,H −K − VL > JH,L − VL and
ii) upgrading-not-segmentation: JUpH,H−K−VL > 0. Using (18) (20) and
the free entry conditions VL = VH = K these necessary conditions can
be written more fully as (73), (74) and (75) respectively.
pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL> 0, (73)
pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH >pL − κ− rK − rUH (74)
pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH > 0 (75)
Once again the equilibrium is characterised using one mass balance
equation for each skill-level of worker and one free entry condition for
each skill-requirement level. For low-skilled workers, contact with ei-
ther low skill-requirement vacancies or high skill-requirement vacancies,
which arrive at rates φθq (θ) and [1− φ] θq (θ), results in match forma-
tion. So, in this case, the mass balance equation becomes (76). For
high-skilled workers, contact with either low skill-requirement or high
skill-requirement vacancies will lead to match formation, so the steady
state mass balance equation, (77), is identical to that in the equilibrium
featuring mismatch without regrading described above (even though in
the present case no mismatch arises):
θq (θ) γu= δ [µ− γu] (76)
θq (θ) [1− γ]u= δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] (77)
Since workers enter employment regardless of the skill requirement
of the vacancy they meet, the flows equations (76) and (77) do not
involve φ, the fraction of vacancies that are for low-skill requirement
positions when originally created. The flow equation for low skilled
workers can be rearranged as θq (θ) = δ [µ− γu] /γu. Substituting this
into the flows equation for high skilled workers gives γ = µ, and also
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θq (θ) = δ [1− u] /u.
The two free entry conditions require the value of a vacancy (for
either skill requirement) to equal the sunk cost of technology adoption,
VL = VH = K. As upgrading maxmises a firm’s payoﬀ, the firm with a
low skill-requirement vacancy forms a match regardless of whether the
worker whom it encounters is high-skilled or low-skilled. So the asset
value equation for a low skill requirement vacancy is
rVL = −c+ q (θ)
h
γ [JL,L − VL] + [1− γ]
h
JUpH,H −K − VL
ii
Substituting for JL,L−VL and JUpH,H−K−VL using expressions (18) and
(20), gives
rVL + c =
[1− β]
r + δ
q (θ)
⎡
⎢⎣
γ [pL − κ− rVL − rUL] +
[1− γ]
"
pH − κ− rVH − rUH
+ [r + δ] [VH −K − VL]
#⎤⎥⎦ . (78)
The flow value of a high skill-requirement vacancy reflects the pres-
ence of downgrading. If a firm with a high skill-requirement vacancy
encounters a low-skilled worker, the capital gain from forming a match
is JDownL.L −K−VH , and if it encounters a high-skilled worker, the capital
gain is JH.H − VH , as before. So:
rVH = −c+ q (θ)
h
γ
h
JDown,UpL.L −K − VH
i
+ [1− γ] [JH.H − VH ]
i
.
which, using (18) and (20), can be expressed as
rVH + c =
[1− β]
r + δ
q (θ)
⎡
⎢⎣
γ
"
pL − κ− rVL − rUL+
[r + δ] [VL −K − VH ]
#
+ [1− γ] [pH − κ− rVH − rUH ]
⎤
⎥⎦ . (79)
We could proceed in a similar manner to the equilibria considered in
previous sections: determine the flow value of unemployment for high-
skilled individuals and for low-skilled individuals, and combine this with
the asset values fior high skill-requirement and low-skill requirement va-
cancies, (78) and (79) and the free entry conditions. However, exploiting
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the equal value condition approach of AV, VL = VH = K, (78) and (79)
can be reduced to the condition γ = [1− γ]. This is consistent with the
earlier result that µ = γ only if µ = 0.5. Moreover, since the system of
equations provides no information on φ thereis insuﬃcient information
to determine unique equilibrium values for u, φ and θ .29
2.3.6 Mismatch With Downgrading
Finally consider the equilibrium which exhibits mismatch with down-
grading. If mismatch arises when a firm with a low skill-requirement
vacancy meets a high-skilled worker, then the resulting capital gain,
JH,L − VL must exceed the gain from either segmentation or upgrad-
ing. This requires two inequalities to be satisfied: JH,L − VL ≥ 0,
JH,L − VL ≥ JUpH,H − K − VL. Using (18) and (20), we summarise this
as conditions (80) and (81). If downgrading arises when a firm with
a high-skill-requirement encounters a low-skilled worker, then the weak
inequality JDownL,L −K − VL ≥ 0 holds. Using (20) this can be expressed
as (82)
pL − κ− rK − rUH ≥ 0 (80)
pL − κ− rK − rUH ≥ pH − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUH (81)
pL − κ− [2r + δ]K − rUL≥ 0 (82)
For high-skilled workers, contact with both low skill-requirement and
high skill-requirement vacancies lead to match formation, so the steady
state mass balance equation (83) is identical to that in the cross-skill
matching equilibrium described above. For low-skilled workers, contact
with low skill-requirement vacancies and high skill-requirement vacan-
cies, which arrive at rates φθq (θ) and [1− φ] θq (θ) respectively, both
result in match formation, so the mass balance equation is (84)
θq (θ) [1− γ]u= δ [1− µ− [1− γ]u] . (83)
θq (θ) γu= δ [µ− γu] (84)
29This situation may be remedied if other parameters are skill-specific, such as the
separation rate, the costs of vacancy creation and bargaining power, see Section 4.
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As in the case of an equilibrium featuring segmentation with upgrad-
ing and downgrading, these equations imply γ = µ, and also θq (θ) =
δ [1− u] /u.
Now the asset value equation for vacancies with low skill-requirements
takes the same form as in the equilibrium featuring mismatch without
regrading. Using (18) and (20) we find
rVL + c =
[1− β]
r + δ
q (θ)
"
γ [pL − κ− rVL − rUL]
+ [1− γ] [pL − κ− rVL − rUH ]
#
. (85)
The flow value of a high skill requirement vacancy takes the same form as
that in the previous section due to the presence of downgrading. When
a firm with a high-skill requirement vacancy encounters a low skilled
worker, the capital gain is JDownL.L −K − VH , but when it encounters a
high skilled worker the capital gain is JH.H − VH , as before. So:
rVH = −c+ q (θ)
£
γ
£
JDownL.L −K − VH
¤
+ [1− γ] [JH.H − VH ]
¤
.
which, using (18) and (20), can be expressed as
rVH + c =
[1− β]
r + δ
q (θ)
⎡
⎢⎣
γ
"
pL − c− rVL − rUL+
[r + δ] [VL −K − VH ]
#
+ [1− γ] [pH − c− rVH − rUH ]
⎤
⎥⎦ . (86)
The two free entry conditions require the value of a vacancy (for either
skill requirement) equal the sunk cost of technology adoption: VL =
VH = K. Notice that, as in the previous section, equations (85) amd
(86) can be combined in the equal value condition. In this case mismatch
with downgrading gives equation (87). Since one of the two free entry
conditions provides no additional information on u, φ and θ compared
with that available from the mass balance equations, (83) and (84), there
is insuﬃcient information to determine the equilibrium of the system in
this case.
K =
[1− γ] [pH − pL]
γ [r + δ]
(87)
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3 Vacancy Creation Costs: A Sensitivity Analysis
What is the impact of fixed costs of vacancy creation? Here I illustrate
the role of fixed costs of vacancy creation by developing a numerical,
using the parameter values adopted by AV and their calibration strategy.
The aim is to put into perspective the results of the existing literature on
mismatch due to diﬀerences in skill-requirements. To that end I conduct
a sensitivity analysis to determine which (if any) candidate equilibria
arise as vacancy creation costs vary, holding other parameters constant.
In particular, when these costs are suppressed, i.e. K = 0, the relevance
of mismatch without regrading and of segmentation without regrading
in the original AV environment is revealed.
Table 1 Here
The parameters set in this approach are {r, δ, α, β, b, c, κ,K, pH , pL} .
The assigned values, taken from the analysis AV (2002) are summarised
in Table 1. In the light of recent work on the empirical properties of
the canonical DMP model, some of these parameters appear unusual.
The choice of a real interest rate of 5%, suggests that AV’s numerical
work should be viewed as applied to data at annual frequencies. This
would be broadly consistent with a separation rate of 20% (whereas at
quarterly frequencies, a separation rate of 10% is standard in recent em-
pirical analysis of the DMP framework, see Shimer (2005)). The match
elasticity of α = 0.5 is standard and relatively uncontroversial. Worker
bargaining strength, β, is set to 0.5, this too is standard, but is the source
of controversy in the DMP literature. The value of leisure, b is set to
0.1; the flow cost of vacancy posting, c and the flow fixed cost of pro-
duction, κ, are both set to 0.3 (most search models suppress the latter).
The productivity of low-skilled workers is normalised to unity. Relative
productivity for high-skilled workers, pH/pL, is set at 1.3. AV (ignoring
the role of sunk costs of vacancy creation) argue that for this value of
relative productivity both the equilibrium with mismatch and the equi-
librium with segmentation (i.e. multiple equilibria) exist. Finally, AV
include a multiplicative free parameter in the matching function, A = 2,
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representing the eﬃciency of the matching technology.30
Figure 1 Here
The pattern of the resulting equilibria is summarised in Figure 1. We
use an indicator function to illustrate whether, for given K, the candi-
date equilibrium satisfies the necessary conditions; this takes the value 1
if, for given K, the necessary conditions are not violated, but takes the
value 0 if any of the necessary conditions for the candidate equilibrium
are violated. Consistent with the arguments presented in Section 2, and
contrary to the existing literature, neither the equilibriumwith mismatch
(without regrading) nor the equilibrium with segmentation (without re-
grading) exists when K = 0. Instead, for low but strictly positive K
there are multiple equilibria, one with downgrading of high-skill require-
ment vacancies, and another with upgrading of low skill-requirement
vacancies.31 As the fixed cost of creating vacancies rises equilibria with-
out regrading emerge to replace the equilibria exhibiting (i) mismatch
or (ii) segmentation). There is a small region in which mismatch exists
as a unique equilibrium. Then at higher costs of vacancy creation, mul-
tiple equilibria occur again as an equilibrium with ex post segmentation
arises. This suggests that the existence of mutiple equilibria might well
confound attempts to determine which equilibrium, if any, is consistent
with the data.
Figure 2 Here
Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate and skill-specific unemployment
rates and between skill wage premia which arise in the model as K is
varied. The figure also indicates the average values (across time) of
these variables in US data. The jumps in the values of aggregate unem-
ployment, u, low-skilled unemployment, uL, and the wage premium, wp,
30Dolado et al. (2008) oﬀer an alternative parameterisation that is closer to the
"standard" values used to calibrate the DMP model to quarterly US data, see Shimer
(2005). In particular, r = 0.01, δ = 0.1 and κ = 0 and A = 1. Qualitatively this
delivers similar results to those obtained from here.
31Notice that the equilibrium with both upgrading and downgrading does not exist
here. This is because it is not possible to compute a solution (not because it violates
one of the necessary conditions).
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arise when new equilibria arise as K is increased. From the perspective
of the empirical plausibility of the model, the key feature is that none
of the equilibria, for any value of K, is capable of matching US data in
relation to these variables.
4 Calibration and Experimental Design
Here I critically appraise the empirical strategy typically used in the
literature on mismatch and propose an alternative data-consistent ap-
proach to evaluate the feasibility of the model and its various equilibria.
4.1 Critique of Existing Approach
Previous work on the AV model and related studies broadly follows the
pattern of the previous Section. Authors assign values to the follow-
ing parameters: {r, δ, α, β, b, c, κ,K, pH , pL} to generate an equilibrium
exhibiting mismatch and use the relevant equilibrium conditions to pin
down equilibrium values of unemployment, u, the fraction of the un-
employed who are low-skilled, γ, labour market tightness, θ, and the
fraction of vacancies which are for low-skill requirement positions, φ. Fi-
nally, necessary conditions for a particular candidate equilibrium, such
as (31), are checked - although given the manner in which parameters
are typically chosen this last step is something of a formality.
There are a number of problems with this approach. (i) While some
of these parameters, such as {r, α, δ} , can be pinned down reliably, oth-
ers can not. Yet these unobservable or poorly measured parameters are
assigned independently of each other and without reference to oberv-
ables, in order to generate an equilibrium of interest (i.e. the one with
mismatch).32 Then observable targets, such as skill-specific unemploy-
ment rates, are not attained, but this is considered neither as a puzzle
to be addressed nor as a suﬃciently significant flaw to warrant rejection
of the model. In short, this approach does not provide a test of the
model. (ii) While empirical work on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
32To achive this, authors do one or more of the following: i) adopt values from
the literature on equilibrium unemployment with homogeneous workers; ii) assign
parameters freely; iii) introduce additional free parameters.
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(DMP) model provides a natural reference point, the associated values
for unobserved parameters are specific to that model, and indeed to the
particular calibration strategy used, and need not carry across to an en-
vironment with heterogeneous workers and (potentially) mismatch. (iii)
Even in the context of the DMP model, there is considerable disagree-
ment over the appropriate values of parameters such as the value of
leisure, b, and worker bargaining power, β, as illustrated by the contro-
versy over the cyclical properties of the DMP model, see Shimer (2005)
and Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008). (iv) The approach adopted in
AV and subsequent work can generate multiple equilibria, and it is then
unclear how one should procede to evaluate the empirical content of
equilibria exhibiting mismatch.
4.2 A Strategy for Calibration and Evaluation
Here we propose a simple 3-step approach. The aim is to allow the ade-
quacy of the model as an account of the data to be investigated. (i) We
calibrate the model to observable targets; a candidate equilibrium which
cannot match these targets is rejected as computationally infeasible. (ii)
The targets for observables are used in conjunction with equilibrium
conditions and accounting identities to pin down values of the unob-
served parameters for each of the computationally feasible equilibria (in
turn).33 (iii) To evaluate which of the computable equilibria arises, I
examine the necessary conditions in conjunction with the targetted and
computed parameters. A candidate equilibrium only arises if it satisfies
all the necessary conditions and the associated parametyer values are
feasible (e.g. non-negative).34 To illiustrate this strategy, we focus on
the equilibrium exhibiting mismatch without regrading.35
33So the computed values of the unobservable parameters are specific not just to
the model, but to the particular candidate equilibrium that is being considered.
34A computable equilibrium which satisfies all the necessary conditions for exis-
tence is said to feasible, whilst a computable equilibrium which does not satisfy all
the necessary conditions is said to be infeasible.
35This involves the equilibrium conditions (22), (23), (29) and (30), as well as the
necessary conditions (31), (32), and (33). In addition we require that low skilled and
high-skilled workers both find the environment suﬃciently attractive to enter into
employment relationships (35) and (36). We also use an accounting identity for the
skill decomposition of unemployment and an expression for the wage premium (34)
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4.2.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match US data, with the length of a period
equal to one quarter. The experiment invariant parameters, with tar-
gets, are summarised in Table 2. Parameters whose calibrated values
vary across experiments are summarised in Table (3). One of the ad-
vantages of this approach is that we adopt an agnostic position on the
magnitudes of these controversial parameters, and are prepared to al-
low them to be determined by the data and the model. However, at
the minimum some sign restrictions should be satisfied, all parameters
should be non-negative and certain parameters, e.g. γ, φ, can only lie in
the unit interval.
Tables 2 & 3 here
Several parameters {r, α, δ} are relatively uncontroversial. We set
the real interest rate r = 0.01, consistent with an annual interest rate of
4%. The matching function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form, to
be linearly homogeneous and to have an elasticity parameter α = 0.5,
consistent with evidence surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
To enhance comparability with the existing literature, the separation
rate is intially assumed homogeneous across workers. We set δ = 0.1,
10% of jobs are destroyed each quarter, following Shimer (2005) and
others.36
The critical issue is how to calibrate the remaining poorly observed
and/or controversial parameters, in particular b,c, K, κ, pH and pL and
pin down the remaining unknowns µ, uL, wp, γ, θ and φ. To reduce the
scale of the problem let us normalise some parameters. Firstly, set the
absolute productivity of low skilled workers, pL = 1, since a knowledge of
the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled is suﬃcient in account-
ing for the wage premium. Secondly, we follow the standard practice
of the equilibrium unemployment literature where the flow fixed cost
of production, κ = 0. Thirdly, for the model presented in Section 2
for a given candidate equilibrium
36In the light of concerns over the relevance of parameter restrictions obtained in
the homogeneous worker set up of the DMP model, we later relax this assumption
and allow separation rates to exhibit skill-specific diﬀerences.
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there are two diﬀerent sources of costs associated with vacancies, K, the
one-oﬀ fixed cost of vacancy creation, and the flow fixed cost of posting
vacancies, c. In the DMP framework an absence of heterogeneity be-
tween workers (and hence jobs) makes the distinction between K and c
irrelevant - at least when considering the steady state.37 Yet, as demon-
strated in Section 2, once workers have heterogeneous skills and firms
can create skill-specific vacancies, the distinction becomes critical - even
when dynamics are not of interest. However, our focus on the steady
state makes it diﬃcult to identify c and K separately, and in any case
evidence on c is thin and model-specific, which makes it diﬃcult to rely
on information from other studies. So for simplicity we set c = 0, and
focus on K.38 Of the remaining unknowns, µ, the fraction of unskilled
workers, u the aggregate unemployment rate, uL the unemployment rate
among the low-skilled, wp the wage premium of skilled over unskilled,
can be pinned down directly in the data. Then γ, θ, φ, b, K and pH
can then be computed in a recursive fashion using a combination of 6
accounting identities and equilibrium conditions from the equilibrium
featuring mismatch without regrading, see below.
We begin with the accounting identity relating aggregate unemploy-
ment to unemployment among specific skill groups
u ≡ µuL + [1− µ]uH
where ui is the unemployment rate among individuals with skill-level i.
The number of low-skilled unemployed, captured above by µuL, can also
be written as γu, the product of the unemployment rate and the fraction
of unemployed who are low skilled. In US data u = 0.06, uL = 0.08 and
µ = 0.66, so
γ = µ
uL
u
= 0.88. (88)
37However, even in the DMP environment, one-oﬀ fixed costs of vacancy creation
can matter out of steady state. Fujita and Ramey (2007), in a contribution to the
controversy over the cyclical properties of the DMP model, calibrate fixed costs of
vacancy creation to match the persistence properties of vacancies in a DMP environ-
ment, while retaining the traditional flow cost of vacancy creation.
38Whereas other studies introduce free parameters we normalise these (to unity in
the case of multiplicative parameters or zero in the case of additive parameters).
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Notice that by insisting that we match the aggregate and skill-specific
unemployment rates, the share of low-skilled amongst the unemployed,
γ, must take this value regardless of which equilibrium holds.
The mass balance equations for high skilled and low-skilled workers
pin down labour market tightness, θ and the fraction of jobs which are
high-skilled, φ.39 The values for θ and φ are specific to the candidate
equilibrium.40 For the equilibrium exhibiting mismatch, equation (23)
gives
θq (θ) = δ
[1− µ− [1− γ]u]
[1− γ]u = 4.62
so to match these targets, given a matching function with elasticity
α = 0.5, labour market tightness, θ, is 21.365. Therefore, φ, the fraction
of vacancies with high skill-requirement, must satisfy the mass balance
equation, (22), for low-skilled individuals:
φ =
δ [µ− γu]
θq (θ) γu
= 0.249
Next we use the equal value condition (29) and the free entry for high
skill-requirement vacancies (30) and an expression for the wage premium
for high-skilled workers (34) to pin down equilibrium specific values for
the value of leisure, b, the size of fixed costs of vacancy creation, K,
and the relative productivity of high-skilled workers, pH . These three
equations must be solved simultaneously.
There is one remaining parameter, β, which captures worker bargain-
ing power. This has been a source of recent controversy in the analysis of
labour market fluctuations using the DMP matching model, see Shimer
(2005), Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008). If our main interest were in
the cyclical properties of the model then it would be straightforward, in
principle, to β assign to target some dynamic property of the model, as in
the DMP literature. However, our concern here is with whether the AV
39The structure in the case of mismatch without regrading is recursive, but for
other candidate equilibria, these two equations may need to be solved simultaneously,
depending on the form of the mass balance equations.
40Some equilibria require all workers who encounter jobs will form matches, regard-
less of the initial skill-requirement of the vacancy that they encounter. For these it is
not possible to determine φ in this way. As a result the system is under-determined.
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model, and particularly the equilibrium exhbiting mismatch is even ca-
pable of explaining the steady state. This is, in a sense, logically prior to
any question about the cyclical properties of the model, which typically
concerns itself with deviations around such a steady state. Therefore
instead of pinning down "the" value of β we sidestep the controvery in
the literature by examining whether there is any feasible range of values
of β for which the AV model is capable of matching the data. For the
purposes of assessing the model in this way, β is a suitable choice of free
parameter, since, unlike say K, it must take a value on a finite interval,
in particular β ∈ [0, 1]. So, for a given value of β ∈ [0, 1], given the
parameters from Table (2), and the equilibrium-specific values of θ and
φ, we use (29), (30) and (34) to pin down expeiment-specific values for
b, K, and pH .
4.2.2 Necessary Conditions and Model Evaluation
We use the necessary conditions, such as (31), (32) and (33), as a means
to test which, if any, of the equilibria which may arise in the model are
consistent with US data. To do this we must evaluate all the necessary
conditions for each candidate equilibrium at each set of calibrated para-
meters (i.e. for each β ∈ [0, 1] and associated γ, θ, φ, b, K and pH). For
any candidate equilibrium, the necessary conditions indicate whether
that equilibrium arises by comparing its consequences against the con-
sequences from an alternative equilibrium. We implement the tests of
existence in the same way. The full implications of this approach, which
rules out multiple equilibria, are most easily understood by means of an
example.
Let us consider both the equilibrium exhibiting mismatch without
regrading and the equilibrium exhibiting segmentation without regrad-
ing. One of the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium featuring
mismatch (without regrading) involves ruling out the equilibrium with
segmentation (without regrading) using (31). One of the conditions for
the existence of an equilibrium featuring segmentation (without regrad-
ing) involves ruling out the equilibrium featuring mismatch (without
regrading) using (??). Notice that the first condition for an equilibrium
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featuring mismatch without regrading is the opposite of the first con-
dition for an equilibrium featuring segmentation. So if one holds, the
other should not.
What this means in practice is that when evaluating the feasibility of
a candidate equilibrium against an alternative equilibrium, terms refer-
ring to the situation in which the candidate equilibrium holds should be
evaluated at the parameter values which occur when candidate equilib-
rium arises, but terms arising under the alternative should be evaluated
at the values that would be taken if the alternative equilibrium were to
arise. So in the case of mismatch versus segmentation, the necessary
condition should be
pMismatchL − κMismatch − rKMismatch − rUMismatchH ≥ 0 (89)
while in the case of segmentation versus mismatch the necessary condi-
tion should be
pMismatchL − κMismatch − rKMismatch − rUMismatchH < 0. (90)
By contrast, when determining the existence of a candidate equilib-
rium AV evaluate both the terms arising in the candidate equilibrium
and thos arising under the alternative as if they arise unser the candidate
equilibrium. This does not aﬀect the outcome for the condition ruling
out segmentation in a mismatch equilibrium, so (89) is implemented, but
for the segmentation equilibrium, AV take all parameters (and variables)
to be those which hold in the equilibrium with segmentation. That is,
AV evaluate whether the following condition is violated41
pSegmentationL − κSegmentation − rKSegmentation − rU
Segmentation
H < 0. (91)
41To be precise, AV use the stategy outlined in Section (3), so the mismatch without
regrading equilibrium and the equilibrium featuring segmentation without regrading
would each be evaluated at (common) parameters {µ, α, δ, r, c,K, κ, b, β, pH , pL}. So,
while u, γ,φ, θ and wp would vary across equilibria exhibiting mismatch and seg-
mentation, this would show up only in the term rUi in the necessary conditions.
Nonetheless, our critique of the multiple equilibrium interpretation of their model
would still apply.
41
But in this inequality, the left hand side computes the value that arises
in the event that the mismatch equilibrium arises using the parameter
values that apply in the segmentation equilibrium. Of course, it is then
quite possible for both (89) and (91) to be satisfied, so that multiple equi-
libria arise. However, this is an artefact of the implementation strategy
for the model, rather than some deep property of the model itself. It is
instantly clear that, as a by-product, our approach (using (89) and (90))
rules out multiple equilibria, and makes the task of evaluating which
(if any) of the model’s equilibria is supported by the data considerably
easier.
In implementing this strategy to evaluate the necessary conditions
for a particular equilibrium using the parameter values appropriate to
the specific alternative considered by each condition, there is an obvious
diﬃculty to be dealt with when one of those alternative equilibria cannot
be computed. For example, none of the candidate equilibria featuring
downgrading exist: because there isn’t suﬃcient information to compute
the outcome for the cases featuring segmentation with both upgrading
and downgrading or mismatch with downgrading.42 To proceed we as-
sume that if a necessary condition involves an alternative for which no
solution to the equilibrium can be computed, then the necessary condi-
tion is deemed to be satisfied.43 If we assume otherwise, then it is never
possible to evaluate all the necessary conditions associated with any of
the equilibria.
42The equilibria that are computationally infeasible arise when workers of a given
skill-level match with the employer that they meet regardless of the skill-requirement
of the vacancy that was initially created. This occurs in the following candidate
equilibria: Segmentation with Upgrading and Downgrading, Mismatch with Down-
grading. In both these cases, φ does not appear in the mass balance equation for
either skilled or unskilled workers. Then there are insuﬃcient conditions to de-
termine {φ,K, b}. Also, the flows identities reduce to the conditions γ = µ, and
θq (θ) = δ [1− u] /u. Notice that this requires that the fraction of low-skilled among
the unemployed equal the fraction of low-skilled in the labour force as a hold. This
is clearly in conflict with the data (which require γ = µuLu ). Only an equilibrium in
which one or other group of workers (and/or firms) do not form employment matches
in some circumstances can reconcile γ = µ and γ = µuLu .
43In principle this can give rise to multiple equilibria (in which segmentation with
upgrading and segmentation with downgrading are both feasible - so segmentation
with both upgrading and downgrading might arise if only it were computationally
feasible).
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Finally, we also require that any candidate equilibrium satisfy the
following participation constraints for unskilled and skilled workers: pL−
κ− rK− rUL ≥ 0, and pH−κ− rK− rUH ≥ 0. These constraints never
bind.
4.3 Summary
To summarise, I use a target driven calibration strategy to assess the
empirical relevance of the equilibria of the model described in Section
(2). For a given β ∈ [0, 1], using the approach outline in this Section,
I determine, where computationally feasible, the parameters associated
with each candidate equilibriium of the model. Provided the computed
parameter values satisfy standard sign restrictions, I examine the neces-
sary conditions. A computationally feasible equilibrium, for which the
parameter values satisfy standard sign restrictions, is said to exist if it
also satisfies the necessary conditions associated with that equilibrium.
Moreover, using the necessary conditions to partition parameter space
appropriately, at most a single equilibrium will exist for any β ∈ [0, 1]
at least to the extent that all equilibria can be computed.
5 Results.
There are 4 key results. (i) If the costs of vacancy creation are sunk, the
model is capable of matching the skill-specific unemployment rate and
wage premium data for the US, as some candidate equilibrium exists for
each feasible value of β ∈ [0, 1]. (ii) Provided β > 0, i.e. if workers have
some bargaining power, the equilibrium with mismatch cannot account
for the data, because the candidate solution (with mismatch) fails to
satisfy the appropriate conditions ruling out other equilibria. (iii) For
values of β between 0 and 0.5 an equilibrium featuring segmentation
without regrading is consistent with the data. For higher values of β,
the equilibrium featuring segmentation with upgrading emerges. (iv)
Equilibria featuring downgrading are never capable of accounting for
observed unemployment and wage premia. We investigate these issues
in more detail below.
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5.1 Feasibility of Calibrated Parameter Values
Figure (3) illustrates the values of calibrated parameters, b, pH , K, φ, θ
across the candidate equilibria.44 This diagram serves to illustrate (for
β ∈ [0, 1]) situations in which a candidate equilibrium can only be cali-
brated to the data by requiring parameters to take infeasible values, and
allows us to compare the implied values to those obtained in other en-
vironments, such as the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework. For
the values of the calibrated parameters to be feasible, we require pH > 1,
so that the productivity of skilled workers(in high skill-requirement po-
sitions exceeds that of low-skilled workers in low skill-requirement po-
sitions (pL = 1). We also require the share of vacancies that are for
low-skill requirement positions, φ, to lie on the unit interval, [0, 1]. Sim-
ilarly for any equilibrium in which low-skilled workers form matches we
require that the value of leisure, b, is less than the productivity of low-
skilled worker in employment, so b ∈ [0, 1). Finally feasible values for
labour market tightness, θ, and K, the cost of vacancy creation / tech-
nology adoption, are positive.
Using this information, the equilibrium featuring segmentation with
downgrading is infeasible at all β ∈ [0, 1] because it requires the fraction
of vacancies which are for low skill requirement positions to be negative((
= -3.0193) to avoid cluttering and distorting the figures information on
this equilibrium is not incorporated in Figure (3).45 Equally, the equi-
librium featuring segmentation with upgrading is infeasible for β < 0.6
as is requires negative values for the sunk cost of technology adoption.
44Note that no information is provided for the equilibria featuring segmentation
with upgrading and downgrading, or the equilibrium featuring mismatch with down-
grading, because in these cases there is insuﬃcient information to pin down unique
combinations of parameter values that enables these equilibria to capture observed
unemployment rates and wage premia.
45From the results in Figure (3) and the discussion in Section (2) we can rule out
any equilibrium involving downgrading due to (i) infeasible parameters or (ii) under-
identification. There is insuﬃcient information to determine the equilibria featuring
segmentation with both upgrading and downgrading and that exhibiting mismatch
with downgrading. This is because in both cases each type of worker forms a match
regardless of which type of vacancy it encounters. Therefore the flows equations do
not pin down the fraction of jobs that are for low skill requirement positions and the
system is undertermined.
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By contrast in the equilibrium featuring mismatch without regrading is
feasible (except for β ∈ (0.45, 0.55)), while the equilibrium featuring seg-
mentation without regrading always generates values for the calibrated
parameters that are feasible.
The values of the calibrated parameters for the equilibrium featur-
ing segmentation without regrading are largely unaﬀected by changes in
worker bargaining power. Calibrating the parameters to observable fea-
tures using the equilibrium conditions arising from the equilibrium fea-
turing segmentation without regrading, high-skilled workers are required
to be around 50% more productive than their low-skilled counterparts.
Interestingly, in the light of the controversy in the recent literature on the
DMPmodel, the value of leisure is close to the productivity of low-skilled
workers, but this holds for all β ∈ [0, 1], not just for low worker bargain-
ing power. The calibrated value of the share of low skill-requirement jobs
in total vacancies is around 1/5, while overall labour market tightness is
around 33. These two values are obtained directly from the labour mar-
ket flows conditions (40) and (41). While their computation does not
involve the free entry conditions or the wage premium condition, they
are clearly consistent wit hthe idea that there are relatively high returns
to opening vacancies for high skill-requirement positions. On the other
hand the notion that 4/5 of the vacancies can only be performed by 1/3
of the labour force seems empirically implausible.
For the equilibrium featuring mismatch without regrading the labour
market flows equations diﬀer from the equilibrium featuring segmenta-
tion without regrading in that high-skilled workers form matches regard-
less of the skill-requirement of the vacancy that they encounter. So the
value of labour market tightness required to match labour market facts is
lower, θ = 21, while the fraction of jobs that are for low skill requirement
positions is higher, φ = 0.25, than in the equilibrium with segmentation.
Also, unlike the equilibrium with segmentation the calibrated values of
b, pH and K are sensitive to β. The most interesting ranges of β are
β ∈ (0, 0.45)∪ (0.55, 1.0), for which the values of b, pH and K decline as
β rises.
For the equilibrium featuring segmentation with upgrading, the flows
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equations are identical to the situation when there is mismatch without
regrading. For the range of values of β (∈ (0.6, 1] ) for which the equi-
librium featuring segmentation with upgrading is feasible, the value of
leisure is broadly similar to the situation for segmentation without re-
grading, and independent of β however, the productivity of high-skilled
workers increases from around 1 to 1.5 as β rises from 0.6 to1. At the
same time (and consistent with the idea that the equilibrium with up-
grading can arise, the calibrated value of K is extremely low.
5.2 Assessing the Necessary Conditions
Next we need to check whether the necessary conditions are satisfied (for
any given value of β ∈ [0, 1]) for each of the 3 candidate equilibria which
can generate feasible calibrated parameter values. Figure (4) illustrates
the feasibility of the remaining equilibria across the full range of values
of β. For each candidate equilibrium, for a given value of β ∈ [0, 1], we
evaluate the necessary conditions required to rule out other equilibria.46
As noted in Section (4.2.2) the necessary conditions that we can evalu-
ate for the 3 feasible candidate equilibira appear in pairs the condition
ruling out segmentation in favour of mismatch is the reverse of the con-
dition ruling out mismatch in favour of segmentation. So we list each
condition only once. The upper panel of Figure (4) is the condition for
examining mismatch versus segmentation (framed with mismatch as the
candidate and segmentation as the alternative). The middle panel con-
siders the condition ruling out segmentation (the alternative) in favour
of upgrading (the candidate), the lower panel illustrates the necessary
condition ruling out upgrading (the alternative) in favour of mismatch
(candidate). Only when β = 0, i.e. the rather uninteresting limit case in
which workers have no bargaining power, and for β ∈ (0.45, 0.55) is the
condition ruling out segmentation in favour of mismatch satisfied . Oth-
erwise, for β ∈ (0, 0.45)∪ (0.55, 1.0), the equilibrium featuring mismatch
without regrading violates the necessary condition ruling out segmen-
tation (31): high-skilled workers prefer to reject low-skill requirement
46We omit the requirements that high-skilled and low-skilled workers participate,
as these are never binding when an equilibrium is otherwise feasible.
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positions, in favour of waiting for a high-skill-requirement position. At
β ∈ (0.45, 0.55), while the condition ruling out segmentation in favour
of mismatch is not violated, it turns out that the parameter values are
infeasible. The condition ruling out upgrading in favour of mismatch,
(32) is violated for similar values of β, but for β < 0.55, the parameter
values are infeasible in the equilibrium featuring segmentation with up-
grading. So when workers have high bargaining power, the sunk costs
of upgrading are suﬃciently low and the relative productivity of high-
skilled workers is suﬃciently high that it is worthwhile for a firm with
a low skill-requirement vacancy to upgrade it rather than try to engage
in mismatch. The middle and lower panels oﬀer further insight on these
other candidate equilibria. The equilibrium with segmentation without
regrading, although generating feasible parameters for all β, violates the
condition ruling out upgrading for β ∈ (0.6, 1.0), since for those values of
β a low value of adoption costsK support the existence of an equilibrium
with upgrading that matches observable features of the data.47
Why is mismatch infeasible? To understand this we examine the
necessary conditions (for mismatch) to see which conditions are violated
(and why). Here we limit discussion to values of β ∈ [0, 0.45] which
appear to be of greatest empirical relevance. This range of values of β
mismatch is rejected in favour of segmentation without regrading (while
upgrading is infeasible). The relevant necessary condition is
pL − rK − rUH =
[r + δ] [pL − rK − b]− [1− φ]βθq (θ) [pH − pL]
r + δ + βθq (θ)
≥ 0
The denominator is positive, and so the validity of the inequality (and
the existence of the equilibrium featuring mismatch without regrading)
depends on the sign of the numerator. How does this vary as β varies?
Although β enters this condition directly only once, the calibrated values
of b, pH and K depend on β. The value of b varies non-monotonically
with β over the range b ∈ [0.65, 0.81], K declines monotonically from
47Meanwhile the equilibrium featuring segmentation with upgrading which arises
at high β, does not occur at low values of bargaining power because in matching
the observed skill-specific unemployment rates and the wage premia, it generates
infeasible (negative) parameter values, for the costs of creating vacancies.
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K = 9.17 to 0.91 as β rises ﬀrom 0.05 to 0.55, while pH declines monoton-
ically from 1.7 to 1.2. For the equilibrium with mismatch r + δ = 0.11,
θq (θ) is approximately 5, φ is approximately 0.25 and pL is normalised
to one, so the numerator in the above expression is
0.11 · [1− 0.01 ·K (β)− b (β)]− 0.75 · β · 5 · [pH (β)− 1]
Using this information, we see that the first term in the numerator
0.11·[1− 0.01 ·K (β)− b (β)] takes a value between 0.01 and 0.03.48 As a
result the sign of the numerator depends on the magnitude of the second
term, [1− φ]βθq (θ) [pH − pL] = 0.75·β ·5·[pH (β)− 1]. First notice that
this term is positive (since pH > pL, 0 < φ < 1, β ∈ [0, 1] and θ > 0).
Then since θq (θ) ' 5 and φ ' 0.25, it follows that for mismatch to exist,
we require [0.75]β ·5·[pH − pL] < [r + δ] [pL − rK − b] ' 0.03. Given the
relative changes in pH−pL and β, this appears most likely to be satisfied
for very low values of β. In particular, as β → 0, [r + δ] [pL − rK − b] '
0.01, so for mismatch to be valid, assuming that pH − pL (=0.75) we
would require have β < 0.01/ [(0.75) · 5 · (0.75)] ' 0.003. Interestingly
this suggests that mismatch might be plausible at the low values of
worker bargaining power suggested by Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008),
but not at the conventional value of β = 0.5.49
5.3 Summary
In summary for a candidate equilibrium to exist (at a given value of
β ∈ [0, 1]) we require that all the calibrated parameter values are feasi-
ble and also that all necessary conditions for that candiadte equilibrium
hold. We summarise this information in Figure (5) which uses an indi-
cator function to illustrate whether the candidate equilibrium generates
infeasible parameter values at that value of β; this takes the value 1 if,
48As β rises rK delines monotonically from 0.09, to 0.01. For β = 0.05, b ' 0.8,
and rK ' 0.09, so [r + δ] [pL − b− rK] ' 0.01, for β = 0.5, b ' 0.8 and rK ' 0.01,
so [r + δ] [pL − b− rK] ' 0.02. b is minimised (b ' 0.65) at around β ' 0.3, then
rK ' 0.3, so [r + δ] [pL − b− rK] ' 0.03.
49Of course in the limit as β → 0, b may rise, and so may pH . This would tend
to reduce still further any threshold value of β for which an equilibrium featuring
mismatch without regrading exists.
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for given β, all the parameter values for a candidate equilibrium are fea-
sible and the necessary conditions are not violated, but takes the value
0 if any parameter is infeasible or if any of the necessary conditions for
the candidate equilibrium are violated. For the low values of β < 0.5
that appear to be of greatest relevance equilibria with mismatch cannot
account for the stylised facts, whereas equilibria. For this range of values
(of β) the equilibrium featuring segmentation without regrading involves
relatively high costs of vacancy creation, while the equilibrium featuring
segmentation with upgrading is infeasible (as the calibrated parameter
values are infeasible). At high relatively high values of worker bargain-
ing power, in fact rather higher than used in the DMP literature, the
observed equilibrium features equilibrium with upgrading. When this
equilibrium arises it features a value of leisure roughly equal to the low-
skilled worker productivity, high skill productivity that is roughly equal
to low skill productivity (for β ' 0.55) rising to around 1.5 times that
of low skilled workers as β → 1, and (unsurprisingly) very low costs
of vacancy creation (and regrading), K, (100 times smaller than in the
DMP literature).50
6 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we analyse a model of mismatch for a frictional labour mar-
ket in which workers diﬀer by skill level, jobs diﬀer by skill requirement
and creating a vacancy with a given skill-requirement entails a fixed cost
(of technology adoption). We assume that there are two skill levels, that
low-skilled workers are unable to perform high skill-requirement activ-
ities, but that all other matches may, in principle, be formed. Fixed
costs of technology adoption, which are omitted from previous studies,
play a critical role. Without fixed costs the equilibria proposed in the
literature do not exist, because a firm is unable to commit to hold open
a job with a given skill requirement in the event that it meets a worker
of a diﬀerent skill level. We show that a much richer set of equilibria
50Form a qualitative viewpoint, these results are robust to extensions which allow
for the separation rate to be skill-specific, and for the costs of technology adoption
to be skill-requirement specific.
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arises if a firm must pay a fixed cost to open a vacancy with a particular
skill-requirement. As well as equilibria with mismatch and with segmen-
tation, new equilibria may arise in which a firm regrades its vacancy so
that its skill-requirements match the skill level of the worker it has met.
We calibrate the model to US data. In contrast to the existing lit-
erature on mismatch, we calibrate to observable targets, such as skill-
specific unemployment rates and wage premia, rather than unobservable
or poorly identified parameters such as the value of leisure, vacancy post-
ing costs and relative productivity. We demonstrate that the existence
of multiple equilibria in previous work is simply an artefact of the cal-
ibration framework adopted therein. Using this calibration strategy we
show that the equilibrium with mismatch cannot arise for any feasible
combination of parameter values; whereas regrading and segmentation
are plausible outcomes.
The proximate reason for the absence of mismatch is the magnitude
of the value of leisure (close to the productivity of low-skilled workers
and that of mismatched high-skilled workers) and the extent of the wage
premium, which reflects the extent to which the productivity of the
high-skilled exceeds that of the low skilled. Given US data mismatch
(without regrading) is ruled out because the observed wage premium
is suﬃciently high, and the value of leisure so close to the high-skilled
worker’s productivity when mismatched, that any high-skilled worker
would reject a low-paying match with a low skill requirement vacancy
in favour of continued unemployment while searching for a high-skill
requirement job. Instead the labour market segments along lines of skill
at low values of worker bargaining power (when upgrading generates
infeasible parameter values).51
One might be tempted to interpret the presence of segmentation as
justification for the simple segmented labour markets approach adopted
in much of the literature on the labour market inequality, see, for ex-
ample, the basic model in Acemoglu and Autor (2010). However, the
51This preference for segmentation is robust to a number of variants of the model
which permit skill-specific job-separation rates and skill-requirement specific vacancy
creation costs.
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ex post segmentation that is present in the model in this paper arises
endogenously - through high-skilled orkers choosing not to form a match
after having met a low skill-requirement vacancy, whereas the tradi-
tional literature on (technological change and) labour market inequality
imposes segmentation exogenously. A natural question then is whether
it is preferable to endogenise the segmentation decision or simply to ig-
nore the possibility of mismatch and proceed to impose segmentation ex
ante. However, microeconometric evidence supports the notion of mis-
match (even using the simple two-skill classification adopted here), see
inter alia Khalifa (2008). And at the same time mismatch appears to
be an interesting and important issue when thinking about productiv-
ity, misallocation and inequality. One possibility is that a richer set up,
for example, allowing for a finer treatment of skill-specific hetereogene-
ity, or for alternative forms of heterogeneity, might help to reconcile the
theoretical framework with the empirical evidence on mismatch.
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Meaning Value
r real interest rate 0.05
α Elasticity of matching function 0.5
δ Separation rate 0.2
β Worker bargaining power 0.5
b Value of leisure 0.1
c Flow cost of vacancy posting 0.3
κ Flow fixed cost of production 0.3
pH
High-skilled worker productivity
in high skill-requirement job
1.3
pL
Low-skilled worker productivity
in low skill-requirement job
1
A Scaling factor in matching function 2
Table 1: Albrecht Vroman (2002) Parameter Values
Meaning Value Target
r real interest rate 0.01 Annual real rate = 4%
α Elasticity of matching function 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
δ Separation rate 0.1 Shimer (2005)
µ Labour force share of low-skilled 0.67 Data
γ Unemployment share of low-skilled 0.88 Data reconcile u and uL
pL
Low-skilled worker productivity
in low skill-requirement job
1 Normalisation
c Flow cost of vacancy posting 0 Normalisation
κ Flow fixed cost of production 0 Normalisation
A Scaling factor matching function 1 Normalisation
Table 2: Experiment-Invariant Parameter Values
Meaning
φ Vacancy share with low skill-requirem’t
θ Overall labour market tightness
b Value of Leisure
pL
Low-skilled worker productivity
in low skill-requirement job
K Fixed cost of vacancy creation
Table 3: Parameters which are not Expeiment Invariant
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of Vacancy Creation Costs on Existence of Equilibria
(AV parameters)
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Figure 2: Labour Market Eﬀects of Vacancy Creation Costs
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Figure 3: Experiment-Specific Parameter Values
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Figure 4: Necessary Conditions
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Figure 5: Existence of Candidate Equilibria
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